Iceland is a recent democratic regime, independent for less than a hundred years. As such it has had to create a national identity for itself in the aftermath of World War II. Fishing was their most important source of revenue and one of the most important sector of their economy, hence an important part of their national identity. In order to comprehend specifically how Icelandic national identity was built, it seems necessary to understand the relevance of the second cod war as the turning point in this long process of national identity building.

One of the main events regarding Iceland’s foreign policy were the Cod wars: they were militarized international disputes opposing Iceland and Britain regarding their fishing zones limits. They were not wars in the common sense, as there were confrontations but never an aggression from any party. The core issue was that Iceland was opposing Britain’s fishing boat practices: they were fishing in zones that Iceland claimed as its own. This led to a confrontation between Icelandic marine forces and British fishing boats and marine forces.

How did coalition changes during the second cod war impact the long-term national discourse at the core of Iceland’s foreign policy?

The outcomes of coalition changes account for the formation of a nationalist foreign policy that strived for independence, which led to this niche policy that guided and shaped Iceland’s narrative discourse for years to come, created upon the Cod Wars. The two most important are the second Cod war (September 1972- November 1973) and the third Cod war (November 1975-Juin 1976) hence this article focusing on it.

A divisive coalition government

This article will tend to answer in detail the core of Iceland’s foreign policy, knowing that an important part of it is explained by its history. For more information on it, we invite our reader to read our background on Iceland’s Cod wars. A few years after the first extension of the maritime fishing zones previously agreed upon by Iceland and Britain on the 1st of September 1972, Icelandic coast guards were starting to go up to 50 miles away from the coast and were becoming more and more pressing with British trawlers. Although this was condemned by Britain, it was not until 19th of May in 1973 that the second Cod war really started, with frigates from the Royal Navy sailing within the new 50-mile limit patrolled by the Icelandic coast guards.

A few years before that, in 1971, the general elections changed the composition of the Althing – the Icelandic Parliament- and put in power a left coalition that completely opposed the previous conservative coalition. Indeed, the coalition holding power until 1971 saw its number of seats decrease from 32 to 28, when the Althing is composed of 63 seats, making the coalition lose its majority. The new coalition in power was then composed of three leftist parties: the Progressives, People’s Alliance, and the Alliance of Liberals and Leftists. It therefore represented a big change in terms of how politics were conducted by Iceland from then on. And in order for one to comprehend the stances of those parties, and to what extent it represented such a shift and a core reason for the Cod wars, it is firstly necessary to understand that the People’s Alliance party has been a critic of the ties between Iceland and the United States for quite some time. Indeed, when Iceland decided to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, with the creation of the Keflavik air base for NATO in this context, the People’s Alliance Party strictly opposed it, and the NATO strategic importance was seen as a rather important means of leverage for the new coalition to achieve certain goals. This new coalition was led in government by the Prime Minister Olafur Johannesson, who was from the Progressives, while the minister of fisheries was from the People’s Alliance Party. The Alliance of Liberals and Leftists was also led by a politician against the NATO, Hannibal Valdimarssen. So two out of three of the party leaders holding power were against NATO in 1971.

The fisheries minister Luovik Josepsson, leader of the People’s Alliance Party, was also the fisheries minister during the first Cod war of 1958. Therefore, he had a record of opposing Britain through the topic of the fishing limit, and he was arguing strongly in favor of a more independent Iceland, which would happen with an extended fishing limit and a withdrawal from NATO.

When the crisis therefore started with the British Royal Navy sailing through the new limit of 50 miles decided upon by the government in 1972, the composition of the coalition and the different interests within the coalition are rather logical in explaining how the conflict took the turn it did. This was even more apparent when it is seen that the public opinion was largely in favor of the two radical parties within the government. Therefore, the British ships were considered as invaders by the government; in the sense that the coalition was mainly led by politicians defending Iceland’s independence, and Prime Minister Johannesson declared on national television that he would request the help of NATO. In this light, indeed, the People’s Alliance leader declared that if there was a NATO base in Iceland, it had to defend Iceland’s territory. This can be seen through the lens that the People’s Alliance leader was a defender of Iceland’s withdrawal from NATO, so to ask for NATO to defend Iceland in this case was a way for him to attack the blockage of Iceland’s independence created by NATO, and therefore a way for him to actually criticize NATO in the aftermath of the crisis. The way the unfolding of the crisis was dealt with will then reveal the contradictions and the struggle within the coalition in power itself.

Indeed, if Prime Minister Johannesson did indeed call for NATO to bomb the British ships, he also declared that Iceland would be open to negotiations led by the Norwegian government. Negotiations would take place only through the Norwegian foreign minister at the time and Agustsson, and only if the British ships left the waters within the 50-mile limit. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister had a more moderate stance on the issue, being from the less radical party of the three, so they were reaching for a compromise, which would also please their own party. Meanwhile however the Prime Minister was radical in his speeches so that it would please the other parties in the coalition that had stronger stances on the issue. Interestingly though, afterwards, and for most part in this case, under the influence of the Althing (the Icelandic Parliament), the Prime Minister had to be strong in his stance since the two other parties’ stance of withdrawal from NATO and of expulsing U.S. soldiers was getting more and more support due to the lack of advancement of the case.

The amplification and intensification of the crisis along with increasing the public support for a stronger handling of the matter led the Progressive party in Iceland to become more vocal and more supportive of completely cutting their relationship with Britain, which left little choice to their leader, the Prime Minister Johannesson. However, the personal stance of Johannesson played a role, since, even though his party supported froze ties with Britain, he tried to appease the situation by refusing to take any diplomatic initiative. It showed that the Prime Minister was not willing to fully sacrifice Iceland’s relationship with Britain, even though there was growing support for it within the coalition. This was acted upon when the Foreign Minister asked for Norway to lead negotiations, allowing the Prime Minister to protect his government from the backlash of possible diplomatic negotiations as the coalition was not supporting it but still permitting diplomatic advancement. Moreover, the threat of breaking diplomatic relations and of withdrawal from NATO were still major arguments used by the Prime Minister, with an ultimatum posed by the government on October 3 of breaking diplomatic relations within 3 days. The next day, the British warships left the 50-mile limit, with the request formulated by the British government of stopping the Icelandic harassment against the British trawlers in Icelandic waters. As a last reminder of the internal struggle of the Icelandic government, Johannesson did not agree to the British demand publicly but did say behind closed doors that “he would do all he could to ensure that there was no harassment”(1).

Furthermore, the public support for a peaceful settlement also increased in Iceland, due to the economic impact of the lasting crisis. Johannesson therefore ceased the opportunity to accept the invitation for talks, allowing for a treaty to be agreed upon by both parties. Even though this broke the unity of the coalition, it was a positive move for the image of the Prime Minister and it allowed for his party to take the lead through the moderate stance, which ultimately prevailed.

This stance, however moderate, still encompassed the idea of the prevalence of an independent Iceland, privileging its fishing over other strategic interests.

The creation national myth: fishing

In 1974, the Althing was dissolved by the Prime Minister, due to a lack of cohesion among the three parties on the issue of wages and inflation. The elections that followed and that took place in June 1974 put back in power the Independence party and the coalition that held power previously to the 1971 election. However, even with a new prime minister and different political parties in power, the third Cod war still occurred in 1975. This is to be understood as the continuation of the extension of the fishing limit, and the turn provoked by the 1971 general elections was to have an irremediable effect on the national image of what the foreign policy of Iceland ought to be. If the policy was formulated and created through the changes of the 1971 coalition, the policy that came out of the crisis and the way it was handled became a constructed ideology and created a myth in the position occupied by Iceland on the international stage. Indeed the policy that arose from the coalition struggles within the leftist Icelandic government in the Second Cod War turned into a nationalistic ideology aimed at independence foreign policies and which guided the foreign policy and actions of Iceland.

The impact of the foreign policy that stemmed from the second Cod war can be seen through the occurrence of the third Cod war. Iceland was still not content with the fishing limits that had been set and further sought to expand its influence and improve its economy through the industry that was vital to its survival. This, again was done at the expense of breaking off diplomatic ties with Britain and the US and under a new government, showing that Iceland’s commitment to following a policy centered on independence lived on beyond the simple party politics that were at the core of the second Cod war. The narrative of the second Cod war has been internalized by the whole political class as an interest going beyond policy-making choices, but as a survival fight for Iceland.

Rational motives: protecting the economy

National interest was seen to stand at the forefront of Icelandic foreign policy in the post second Cod war era. On the international stage, Iceland did not involve itself or little in institutions, unless it involved direct economic or material interests. Its main focus was to secure its fishing interests especially its fishing zones limits. For instance, it didn’t believe that the EEC could benefit Iceland’s interests didn’t see the EEC and even worried that the joining a single marker would put these interests at risk. There was no need felt by Iceland to join in on international collaboration on free trade and economics in the first place because its economy relied so heavily on fishing and fishing quotas, for instance, and joining the EEC would only put Iceland’s economy at a disadvantage. By entering the EFTA in 1970 and their membership in the EEA agreement, however, Iceland ensured its interests would remain secure. Iceland’s foreign policy also led to protectionist legislation, that consisted of protective tariffs among other measures, within Iceland and a closed off economy reluctant to open up to imports, such as those of agricultural products. Similarly, the EEA agreement clashed with Iceland’s independence driven policy as it constituted a potential problem for sovereignty. The agreement required a transfer of sovereignty that could have been considered at odds with Iceland’s nationalist policies. Ultimately, however, the economic interests prevailed, and Iceland signed on to the agreement.

Iceland’s economic and trade relations with the EU are mainly governed by the bilateral Free Trade Agreement with the EEC since 1972, which includes most marine products. As a member of EFTA, since 1970, Iceland has an open and free access to the unique European market but has no obligations to trade fishing rights, or limit its fishing zone in return. This is a perfect example of Iceland foreign policy: Iceland’s aims to gain economic advantages while protecting its fisheries were mostly secured.

Iceland used this rationalist reasoning, however, to justify the use of its nationalist foreign policy. While these reasons in part account for the rationale behind Iceland’s need to secure its fishing industry, Iceland’s foreign policy is mainly shaped by the narrative that was constructed and emerged as a result of coalition struggles in 1971, linking fishing not only to economic benefits, but to national identity, as it was an industry that enabled Iceland to sustain itself without the aid of other powers. It is this narrative which caused Iceland to believe fishing, rather than issues of defense or concerning its membership in NATO, was the most crucial aspect of its policy.

While the outcome of coalition changes explains the specifics of the 1971 cod war, on a broader scale it also can account for how the nationalist independence-centric ideology went from a niche ideology to a national long-term policy, transcending the simple economic interest, even after the erosion of the 1971 coalition.

Even though there was a context of uncertainty due to the opposition of the western and eastern bloc (as it was the Cold war), Iceland threatened to leave NATO. This was a huge risk at it would have removed Iceland from the US security umbrella. However, this affirmed the stance of Iceland as an independent country. Even though it could have enjoyed greater economic benefits from getting involved in the European Agreements, the myth structured by the second Cod war and the turning point done by the coalition changes created a narrative for its foreign policy in which its independence held greater importance, and in which joining the European agreements would endanger its fishing interest.

Since then, the fishing interest has been incorporated as not only a part of the foreign policy, but also a recurring item of Icelandic national interest on a larger scale, and to defend their interest in this domain is to not only defend their economic interest but also to defend a part of their national identity. In this sense, it has been shaping the views of Icelandic politicians, since they have been influenced by this element and they have the perception of it being an integral key element to understand their own people. The perception of fishing as the national interest is not fully biased and constructed, since there could be a rational argument behind it through the statistics on the composition of the GDP, but there is definitely a cultural element attached to the visceral protection of this sector from any external intervention, be it the British in 1971 or Europe nowadays.

As an illustration of this, several years later, the Mackerel wars demonstrated Iceland’s prioritization of its fishing industry above all else, which came to be perceived as vital because of the nationalistic ideology Iceland adopted. The Mackerel Wars, basically an economic war between Iceland and the European Union, occurred on the grounds that Iceland decided to put an end to the quotas agreed upon by both parties on the fishing quotas of Mackerel.

Therefore, this unilateral decision, putting at risk the relationship between the European Union and Iceland, has to be looked upon through the lens of the myth of protecting fishing at all costs as the way of asserting the island’s independence. Indeed, the European Union is the biggest trading partner in terms of exports for Iceland, and to put this relationship at risk for the sake of protecting their perceived national interest, could be questioned, but it also proves that Iceland has been basing, may it be blindly, their foreign policy on this myth created in 1971.

While it put forth another application for membership on 17 July 2009, it decided in May 2013 to put the EU accession negotiations on hold, as a way of asserting, once again, the priority given to fishing as the main element of their foreign policy.

Fishing as the core foundation of the island’s independence has been incorporated as the main discourse conducting their affairs since the 1970s. The second cod war represented a turning point and the coalition changes that happened in 1971 had to be taken into account as a key factor in explaining this turning point in Iceland’s foreign policy. However the viability of having this element as the keystone of their foreign policy can be put into questions when taking into account the globalizing process of our world and the diversification of Iceland’s economy, even if the cultural discourse surrounding it holds a unifying role for Iceland.

Bibliography

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  • Valur Ingimundarson (2003) Fighting the Cod Wars in the Cold War: Iceland’s challenge to the Western Alliance in the 1970s, The RUSI Journal, 148:3, 88-94, DOI: 10.1080/03071840308446895
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